A spiritual Ishmaelite

Dear Engineer,

The phrase adversarial sympoiesis is doing important work here, and it is worth honoring its precision before placing it under the lens of cooperative game theory. Sympoiesis names systems that are collectively produced without a single controlling center; adversarial qualifies this cooperation as emergent through opposition rather than shared intent. What you are pointing to, therefore, is not an alliance but a co-evolutionary lockstep in which two camps that imagine themselves antagonists end up stabilizing one another’s strategies, narratives, and payoffs.

Consider first the two players as ideal types rather than sociological caricatures. “Liberal Islamophobes” in this context are not explicit bigots but actors operating within liberal moral language who treat Islam as a civilizational problem to be managed, disciplined, or secularized. They tend to frame themselves as defenders of women’s rights, free speech, and enlightenment rationality, while implicitly assuming Islam’s incompatibility with these goods. “Liberal Salafism,” by contrast, is not classical Salafi theology but a modern, media-facing puritanism that adopts liberal procedural tools—NGO discourse, rights language, algorithmic visibility—while advancing a rigid, decontextualized Islam that rejects historical plurality, jurisprudential ambiguity, and civilizational thickness.

At the level of intention, these two players appear to be in zero-sum conflict. At the level of systemic outcome, they are locked into a repeated cooperative game with perverse equilibria.

Cooperative game theory shifts attention from isolated moves to payoff structures, coalition formation, and stability conditions. When applied here, it reveals that both actors benefit from narrowing the representational bandwidth of Islam. Liberal Islamophobes benefit because a reductionist, literalist Islam is easier to criticize, regulate, and securitize. Liberal Salafists benefit because an Islam presented as besieged, misunderstood, and under liberal assault is easier to purify, mobilize, and monopolize. Each actor’s rhetorical extremity increases the other’s marginal utility.

This creates what can be described as a negative-sum sympoietic coalition: the total civilizational payoff is negative, but each player locally maximizes utility relative to available alternatives. In cooperative game terms, Islam itself—the lived, plural, historically layered civilizational reality—is treated as a common-pool resource that both sides extract from without incentives for replenishment. Liberal Islamophobes extract symbolic proof of incompatibility; liberal Salafists extract symbolic proof of persecution. The tragedy is not merely moral but structural.

Repeated-game dynamics deepen the trap. Each side learns, iteration after iteration, that moderation is punished. When liberal critics acknowledge Islamic intellectual diversity, their critique loses viral traction and moral clarity. When Salafi actors acknowledge jurisprudential plurality or ethical ambiguity, they risk internal defections and loss of authority. Thus, strategies converge toward maximal simplification. This convergence is not collusion; it is evolutionary convergence toward a stable but pathological Nash equilibrium.

From a signaling perspective, both players engage in costly signals that are mutually legible. The Islamophobe signals moral seriousness through selective outrage and performative universalism. The Salafi signals authenticity through ascetic rigidity and rejection of contextual reasoning. Each signal is interpreted by the other as confirmation of threat, thereby justifying escalation. The audience—media institutions, policy actors, algorithmic platforms—acts as a silent third player that rewards polarization with attention, funding, and legitimacy, further stabilizing the equilibrium.

What makes this sympoiesis particularly resilient is that it masquerades as principled disagreement while functioning as structural cooperation. Each side needs the other’s excesses to justify its own existence. Remove the caricatured Salafi, and liberal Islamophobia loses its most convenient exhibit. Remove the hostile liberal gaze, and Salafi puritanism loses its siege narrative. In cooperative-game terms, they form an implicit blocking coalition against alternative players: traditional Sunni pluralism, Shi‘i ethical jurisprudence, Sufi moral psychology, and historically grounded reformist thought. These alternatives threaten the equilibrium by expanding the strategy space and introducing positive-sum outcomes.

From a civilizational engineering standpoint, this is the key insight: the problem is not merely ideological error but incentive misalignment. As long as public discourse rewards simplification, adversarial sympoiesis will outcompete integrative truth. Breaking the equilibrium therefore requires introducing new payoff structures, not merely better arguments.

One such intervention would be the deliberate cultivation of costly pluralism: intellectual positions that are harder to communicate but yield higher long-term collective payoffs. Another would be institutional designs that reward interpretive depth, historical literacy, and ethical restraint rather than affective outrage. In game-theoretic language, this means altering the characteristic function of the game so that coalitions grounded in epistemic humility and moral complexity become viable and stable.

A counter-perspective is worth stating explicitly to avoid romanticism. One could argue that this adversarial sympoiesis is an unavoidable phase of modernity, a necessary turbulence before equilibrium at a higher level of integration. History does show that civilizational self-understanding often sharpens through distortion before it stabilizes. The risk, however, is that prolonged negative-sum equilibria can exhaust the very resources needed for later recovery: trust, scholarly institutions, and moral patience.

Seen in this light, your framing is not merely diagnostic but strategic. To name adversarial sympoiesis is to refuse the illusion that shouting louder from one side will collapse the other. It clarifies that the real work lies in redesigning the game itself: who gets visibility, who gets credibility, and which forms of Islam are allowed to appear as intellectually adult rather than perpetually on trial or permanently enraged.

There is a quiet irony here that cooperative game theory, often associated with cold rationalism, ends up pointing toward ethical depth. The most rational move, in the long run, is not domination but reconfiguration: replacing adversarial sympoiesis with a sympoiesis of restraint, plurality, and civilizational confidence. That is a harder game to play, but unlike the current equilibrium, it actually converges toward collective gain rather than shared depletion.